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I. INTRODUCTION
June Allyson Green travelled on a Greyhound bus en route to
Atlanta, Georgia from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. After the bus stopped
briefly in Macon, Georgia, the bus driver demanded that Green get off
the crowded bus because she weighed over 300 pounds and the man next
to her could not fit into his seat. When she refused, several police
officers handcuffed her and arrested her for disorderly conduct.
Although the police later dropped the charges, Green filed a civil suit
against Greyhound for $ 2.25 million.'
Alexis Adams has also experienced overt displays of weight dis-
crimination. She no longer shops for groceries during the day when
stores are crowded. In the past, other customers have removed items
from her cart and exclaimed "You don't need that."2 Lauren R. Januz
complains that he cannot eat in many restaurants that have "'fixed seats'
or 'booths' in which the distance between the chair and the table is not
adjustable."3 Reacting to this dilemma in 1991, he threatened to bring a
lawsuit against McDonald's if it did not remedy the problem confronting
overweight customers.' The discrimination against these individuals is
apparent when considering the reaction Mr. Januz received from an
attorney he approached when seeking representation: "If anything,
1. Fat Lady Sings the Greyhound Bus Blues, THE GAZETr, Apr. 1, 1992, at Al l.
2. Michael Blumfield, Fat People Organize to Fight Against Discrimination, THE GAZmErE,
Apr. 26, 1992, at DI.
3. Mike Royko, A Discrimination Charge Hits Bottom, CHI. TRm., May 22, 1991, at 3C.
4. Id.
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McDonald's might be sending him a subtle and considerate message by
providing chairs that don't accommodate his bulk. They might be say-
ing: 'If you can't fit into our chairs, you shouldn't be eating our
food.' "5
Sally Smith must purchase two seats if she plans to travel on com-
mercial airlines, but the airlines refuse to double her frequent flyer mile-
age.6 She now heads the National Association to Advance Fat
Acceptance (NAAFA). The California based group fights discrimina-
tion based on obesity.7 The group planned a "demonstration against
South West Air to protest a recent incident in which a fat passenger was
escorted from his seat by four armed policemen because he was
'encroaching' on his neighbour [sic]."' 8
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in places of
public accommodation. 9 It guarantees all individuals "the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.., without dis-
crimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin."'10 The statute, however, fails to recognize handicapped
persons as a protected class. In response, Congress passed the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA") to protect against other
prevalent forms of discrimination.1 Arguing that obesity is a handicap,
some have successfully used the ADA to challenge unfair employment
practices based on the employee's weight and appearance.' 2 Some
states have enacted supplemental protections. For example, Michigan
has passed its own legislation to specifically protect victims of weight
discrimination in the employment context.' 3 However, even with this
legislation, June Allyson Green, Alexis Adams, Lauren Januz, and Sally
5. Id.
6. James Bone, Sizing Up the Opposition, THE TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at Features.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1992).
10. Id.
11. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1989). Congress signed the
bill into law on July 26, 1990.
12. See discussion infra part III: WEIGHT AS A HANDICAP.
13. Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 37.2102 (1992). Presently,
Michigan is the only state that has passed such legislation. This state legislation serves an
important function because "[tlhere is no question that society in general discriminates against
overweight people." Donald L. Bierman, Jr., Employment Discrimination Against Overweight
Individuals: Should Obesity be a Protected Classification?, 30 SArA CLARA L. REv. 951, 958
(1990). When NAAFA recently surveyed 445 of its members, the results indicated that
"employers believed that fat people lacked energy, would be poor role models or were mentally
handicapped." Id. at 959 (footnote omitted).
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Smith have no protection against the weight discrimination that they
experience daily in places of public accommodation.
This Comment will evaluate the issue of weight discrimination in
public accommodations in light of the enactment of the ADA. Part I
examines the legislative history of the ADA and state legislation prohib-
iting similar forms of discrimination. Part II discusses whether courts
will consider weight as a handicap or disability, by examining the lim-
ited caselaw available in the employment context. Part III focuses on
the rights of the obese to access public accommodations and their pros-
pects for legal redress in the future. The Comment concludes with sev-




Thirty years ago, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
This legislation attempted to eliminate discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin in the contexts of employment
and public accommodations, but it failed to protect the rights of the
handicapped. In order to remedy this oversight, Congress enacted the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.' 5 The Rehabilitation Act purported to
"develop and implement, through research, training, services, and the
guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated pro-
grams of vocational rehabilitation and independent living."16 Further,
the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination and requires that employ-
ers provide reasonable accommodations for qualified handicapped
employees.' 7 The Rehabilitation Act defined an "individual with a disa-
bility" as any person who "(i) Has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activi-
ties, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having
such an impairment.' 8 A "physical or mental impairment," as used in
this definition, included any physiological, neurological, musculoskele-
tal or sensory disorder.' 9 According to the Act, "major life activities"
encompass caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, see-
ing, breathing, learning and working. 20 However, "'[h]andicapped' is
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (1990).
15. Id. §§ 701-96 (1993).
16. Id. § 701 (1993).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 706(8)(B).
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b) (1992). "[E]xcept in rare circumstances, obesity is not
considered a disabling impairment." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c) (1992).
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not an absolute term but rather a label imposed by society, and much of
handicap law consists of deciding who qualifies for that protected cate-
gory. ' '2 ' The Act, however, "was limited to federal activities [activities
that received federal funds] and left a gaping hole in the protections
offered."22
B. Rights and Remedies Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
On July 26, 1990, President Bush signed the ADA into law.23 The
Act responded to Congressional findings that
some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a
whole is growing older; ... discrimination against individuals with
disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing,
public accommodations, education, transportation, communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to
public services; ... individuals who have experienced discrimination
on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress
such discrimination; . . . [these individuals] are severely disadvan-
taged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally; ...
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individu-
als and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of
the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and con-
tribute to, society.24
The ADA "is a sweeping statute viewed as no less than a 'bill of rights'
for citizens with a wide variety of disabilities who have been subjected
to discrimination.., and who generally have been excluded from many
aspects of life taken for granted by the able-bodied. '25 Adopting the
21. Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination
on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REv. 2035, 2046-47 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
22. Robert E. Stein, A New 'Bill of Rights'for Millions: The Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, AraB. J. June, 1991 at 6, 8. Congress has since amended the Rehabilitation Act to cover
all the activities of a federally-sponsored entity, but it has never applied to organizations which
did not receive federal funds. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1992).
24. Id. § 12101.
25. Stein, supra note 22, at 6. "As stated by the House Education and Labor Committee:
'These provisions are intended to prohibit exclusion and segregation of individuals with
disabilities and the denial of equal opportunities enjoyed by others based on, among other things,
presumptions, patronizing attitudes, fears and stereotypes about individuals with disabilities."'
Peter A. Susser, The ADA: Dramatically Expanded Federal Rights for Disabled Americans, 16
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 157, 171 (1990) (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No.485, 101st Cong.
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 102 (1990)). Ronald L. Mace described an example of this discrimination before
Congress in 1989. He testified that he and his wife were "refused service in seafood restaurant
because they 'could not sit on the stools at ...the oyster bar'; when asked about other
arrangements Mr. and Mrs. Mace and their party were told 'to get out and don't ever come back'."
Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 923,
(Vol. 48:649
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definition of "handicap" delineated in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,26
the ADA prohibited discrimination in employment, public services
including public transportation, public accommodations operated by pri-
vate entities, and telecommunications.
Title IIU, the most unique section of the ADA, combined attributes
of both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in its protection of the handi-
capped, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in its extension to public
accommodations.27 Title Ill specifically prohibited discrimination "on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, serv-
ices, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place
of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to),
or operates a place of public accommodation."2 Although clear in its
mandate, applying Title III has proved quite difficult. "While there is
924 n.7 (1989) (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 70
(1989)).
26. "'[D]isability' means, with respect to the individual- (A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(1992). The third prong includes
individuals' who have physical or mental impairments that do not substantially limit
a major life activity, but are treated ... as constituting such a limitation .... any
individual who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major
activity only as a result of the attitude of others toward such impairment, or has no
physical or mental impairment, but is treated ... as having such an impairment.
Susser, supra note 25, at 161 (emphasis added); see also infra note 70.
27. "For individuals with disabilities, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
... provides an analogous [to], but broader [than the Civil Rights Act of 1964], prohibition against
discrimination in public accommodations." Robert L. Burgdorf Jr.,"Equal Members of the
Community: " The Public Accommodations Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64
TEMP. L. REv. 551, 553 (1991) (footnote omitted). A 1986 national survey, which "paint[s] a
sobering picture of an isolated and secluded population of individuals with disabilities,"
emphasizes the importance of Title III. Id. "The large majority of people with disabilities do not
go to movies, do not go to the theater, do not go to see musical performances, and do not go to
sports events. A substantial minority of persons with disabilities never go to a grocery store, and
never go to a church or synagogue." Id. (quoting NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY OF THE 1986 HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES 35 (1988)). The two reasons cited for the isolation of overweight individuals from
society were feelings of not being welcome and the inadequacy of public accommodations. Id. at
554.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1992). "'Full and equal enjoyment' involves two distinct aspects.
One is that the place of public accommodation must be physically accessible to a disabled
individual. Second, the disabled individual must be able to have the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services and facilities of places of public accommodation." Stein, supra note 22, at 12.
"While the definition of public accommodations in the ADA is broad, it applies only to private
entities. Buildings owned by state and local governments are not within the definition of public
accommodation, but most will be covered by the 'public service' provisions in Title II of the
ADA." Burgdorf, supra note 27, at 558-59 (footnotes omitted). Title II prohibits discrimination
in specified public transportation services provided by private entities. "No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of specified public
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considerable history under the Rehabilitation Act to interpret Title I of
the ADA [to redress discrimination in the employment context], Title III
has less to go on."29 Because the Rehabilitation Act lacks a similar pro-
vision and the Civil Rights Act fails to cover handicapped persons, these
Acts provide little guidance to courts interpreting Title III. Additionally,
Congress could not compile an exhaustive list of all covered conditions,
so courts must determine which disabilities constitute protected
"handicaps."30
Further, Title III requires compliance with a series of accessibility
mandates.3' It guarantees disabled individuals equal access to public
accommodations and an opportunity to participate equally in society,
unless the modifications would "fundamentally alter" the business of the
entity or result in an "undue burden."32 If a business does not meet these
specifications and adherence would not result in an undue burden, Sec-
tion 12188 of the ADA provides for various remedies.33
Pursuant to Section 12188, the Attorney General must investigate
violations, and if "such discrimination raises an issue of general public
transportation services provided by a private entity that is primarily engaged in the business of
transporting people and whose operations affect commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 12184(a).
29. Stein, supra note 22, at 12.
30. Susser notes:
[L]egislative history makes clear that the term [physical or mental impairment]
includes such conditions, diseases, and infections as: orthopedic, visual, speech and
hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple
sclerosis, infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities,
drug addiction, and alcoholism. At the same time, it is clear that the term 'physical
or mental impairment' does not include simply physical characteristics, such as blue
eyes or black hair.
Susser, supra note 25, at 160.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (1992). These include reasonable modifications, auxiliary
aids and services, and the removal of architectural barriers. Mr. Durenberger remarked in a
Congressional hearing on the passage of the ADA:
Seventeen percent of the population-I in 6 Americans-is challenged by some
activities that most of us take for granted: Eating at a restaurant; going to a movie;
riding a bus; visiting a doctor; shopping for groceries .... But that will all change.
January 26 was the effective date for portions of the ADA that affect public
accommodations and services .... Tables, chairs, and racks may be rearranged in
restaurants, theaters, and retail stores.
138 CONG. REC. S614-03 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (emphasis added).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (1992).
33. These remedies are available to:
any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation of this subchapter or who has reasonable grounds for believing that such
person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation of section 12183 [New
construction and alterations in public accommodations and commercial facilities] of
this title.
42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (1992).
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importance, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any
appropriate United States district court."'34  The district court then has
the option to grant the appropriate equitable relief,35 award other relief
within its discretion, including granting monetary damages to the
aggrieved individual, if the Attorney General requests,36 or assessing a
civil penalty against the entity.37 Because the provision only went into
effect on January 26, 1992, the full extent and effect of these remedies
have not yet been tested. However, prior to its enactment, Bonnie P.
Tucker, Associate Professor of Law, predicted that "when the ADA is
enacted, discrimination on the basis of disability will be as significant an
issue as discrimination on the basis of race or sex."38 Whether courts
will consider weight a handicap still remains to be seen, 39 although
obesity should constitute a disability under the definition supplied by the
ADA.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B)(ii) (1992).
35. This includes "(i) granting temporary, preliminary, or permanent relief; (ii) providing an
auxiliary aid or service, modification of policy, practice, or procedure, or alternative method; and
(iii) making facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12188(b)(2)(A) (1992).
36. These damages may not include punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (b)(4) (1992).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(C) (1992). The civil penalty may not exceed $50,000 for a first
violation or $100,000 for any subsequent infractions. Id. The Act also specifically instructs the
court to consider the defendant's "good faith effort or attempt to comply" with the mandates of the
Act when determining the amount of an appropriate civil penalty. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(5)
(1992).
38. Tucker, supra note 25, at 939.
39. In a 1990 Congressional hearing, The Honorable William E. Dannemeyer shared his
feelings on the protection of the overweight under the ADA and discussed a recent editorial from
a local newspaper:
I would like to draw my colleagues' attention to . . . another application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, this time to full civil rights protections to
overweight citizens who, presumably, will argue in court that their physical
condition impairs their ability to carry out one or more major activities of life....
No one who voted for this well-intentioned legislation thought it would apply to the
sort of situations described in this editorial. I respectfully suggest that, as the clever
trial lawyers in this Nation learn how to manipulate the provisions of the ADA to
suit their clients' purposes, there will be many additional such cases. ...
[A] building contractor named Donald Keister demanded that he be declared a
minority for purposes of government contracts. The city sets aside 25 percent of its
contracts for firms owned by 'minorities.'
Now, Keister is white, and he's male, but he's very, very big, tipping the scale
at an awesome 640 pounds. Because his amplitude hinders him in this work-he
says he falls through floorboards whenever he visits construction sites-he has
rightly declared that the disabilities act qualifies him as a minority. Ergo: Give him
a contract.
136 CONG. REc. E3517-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of The Honorable William E.
Dannemeyer).
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C. State Legislation
Most state legislatures have also responded to weight discrimina-
tion by passing laws that protect the rights of the handicapped and dis-
abled.4 0 "In many cases, state and local court interpretations of state
human rights laws are more expansive than federal court interpretations
of the [ADA]. For example, state courts have held that state handicap
acts cover the obese."41 By interpreting the "handicap" provisions
broadly, state courts have extended coverage to the overweight. Michi-
gan even enacted a specific provision in 1985 that protected overweight
individuals.4 2 The Michigan law prohibits discrimination "with respect
to employment, compensation, or a term, condition or privilege of
employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex,
height, weight, or marital status."43 Although the statute contains a pub-
lic accommodations provision, it fails to list "weight" as a protected
classification in public places.
Maryland contemplated legislation that would protect the rights of
the overweight, but at the writing of this Comment, no such legislation
had been passed." The City of Santa Cruz also has proposed a munici-
pal ordinance that declares it is "unlawful for a business establishment
or place of public accommodation to... deny, directly or indirectly, any
person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations . . .
40. For example, Louisiana law provides: "In access to public areas, public accommodations,
and public facilities, every person shall be free from ... arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
discrimination based on... physical or mental disability." LA. REV. STAT. § 49:146 (West. 1992).
The Maine statute declares:
It is unlawful public accommodations discrimination, in violation of this Act:...
For any person who is the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent
or employee of any place of public accommodation to directly or indirectly refuse,
withhold from or deny to any person, on account of .. .physical or mental
disability, . . .any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of
public accommodation ....
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4592 (1992). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64 (1992); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 5 (1993); N.Y. [ExEc.] LAW § 296 (Consol. 1993) for similar provisions.
41. Note, supra note 21, at 2044 (footnote omitted); see discussion infra Part III: WEIGHT AS
A HANDICAP.
42. Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMp. LAWS § 37.2102 (1992).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Senator Donald F. Munson (R-Washington), commenting on the possibility of Maryland's
passage of a bill banning weight discrimination, remarked, "[the law would address]
discrimination on the basis of 'size' in the same manner current law bans it on the basis of race,
creed, sex, age, color, national origin, marital status or handicaps. It would apply to
discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodations. It would not outlaw
rudeness." Richard Tapscott, Md. Panel Airs Tales of Size-Based Bias; Senate Bill Would Extend
Discrimination Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1991, at B5.
45. SANTA CRUZ MUN. CODE § 9.83.05 (1992).
[Vol. 48:649
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IIM. WEIGHT AS A HANDICAP
As the ADA is only two years old, courts have not yet scrutinized
its definition of "handicap" extensively. For that reason, it is difficult to
predict whether courts will define weight as an ADA protected disabil-
ity. Accordingly, an intuitive examination of how federal courts con-
strue the definition in actions brought under the Rehabilitation Act and
how state courts interpret "disability" under similar state laws is crucial
to understanding this area.46 Several recent cases examine the two
obstacles that a litigant must overcome to establish a cause of action for
weight discrimination: medical verification and the extent of the impair-
ment. Courts have approached this issue in an arbitrary fashion. Each
court has required a different proffer to establish a prima facie case of
weight discrimination.47
In the recent decision of Cook v. State of Rhode Island,"8 the First
Circuit examined weight discrimination in the employment context
under the Rehabilitation Act, and contrary to the district court's deci-
sion, reasoned that obesity need not be immutable or involuntary to war-
rant protection under federal legislation.49 After reapplying for a
position as an attendant at an institution for the mentally ill, Bonnie
46. It is important to note that the Rehabilitation Act only applies to discrimination in the
workplace, as does most state legislation on point. Therefore, this discussion will concentrate on
the employment context.
47. See Cook v. State of R.I., Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1 st
Cir. 1993); State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985); Missouri
Comm'n on Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
48. Cook v. State of R.I., Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st
Cir. 1993).
49. Id. at 23-24. Cf. Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981)
(holding that obesity is not a handicap because it is not an immutable characteristic). Greene
seems to rely on the argument that
appearance is under the control of the individual, and that individuals who do not
present a more appealing physical appearance are themselves at fault. This
argument is frequently made in the case of the obese. In many instances, however,
this simply is not true. Recent evidence suggests that many obese people are
overweight for biological reasons largely beyond their own control.
Note, supra note 21, at 2036 n.5 (footnotes omitted).
Furthermore, it is possible for medical professionals to differ in their findings on the cause of
obesity. "Definitions of obesity make no mention of reasons or causes for the condition....
Frequently, however, the underlying cause of the obesity is not understood or explainable. While
it is estimated that twenty percent of the population is obese, few of these people have an identifi-
able medical disorder causing the obesity." Bierman, supra note 13, at 957 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
The requirement that a physiological or genetic problem, rather than self-imposed overeating,
caused the litigant's obesity, may turn the trial into a "battle of the experts." This requirement will
only be favorable to the overweight plaintiff if medical experts do not dispute the cause of her
obesity, or if her experts carry greater credibility with the court. Realistically though, the defend-
ant-corporation will have greater resources to accumulate its own extensive expert testimony to
bolster its position. This approach gives the trial judge wide discretion to decide a medical ques-
1994]
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Cook received the job, contingent on her losing weight.5" She refused,
and sued the State Department of Mental Health for discrimination
based on her obesity. In determining whether obesity constituted a
handicap, the lower court examined the administrative regulations per-
taining to the interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act.51 Since the regu-
lation contemplates a "physiological disorder affecting a body system,"
Cook was required to proffer additional proof concerning the extent and
effect of her disability.52 However, the First Circuit noted the irrele-
vance of both mutability and voluntariness to the determination of
whether weight may be considered a handicap and concluded mutability
and voluntariness should only be examined in determining "whether a
condition has a substantially limiting effect. '53 Upholding the jury's
award of $100,000 in compensatory damages, the First Circuit noted that
in "a society that all too often confuses 'slim' with 'beautiful' or 'good,'
morbid obesity can present formidable barriers to employment. Where,
as here, the barriers transgress federal law, those who erect and seek to
preserve them must suffer the consequences."54
Other courts have taken different approaches to resolve the issue.
State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp.5 and Missouri Comm'n on
Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.56 demonstrate the inconsis-
tency and the arbitrariness of each court's approach. In Xerox,5 7 the
court refused to differentiate between self-imposed obesity and that
which results from an immutable condition, just as the First Circuit had.
tion, and the final determination will likely be based on the judge's own experiences and percep-
tions of diet and weight control.
50. Cook v. State of R.I., Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 834 F. Supp. 57,
60 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
51. Id. at 62. According to 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2) (1992), physical impairment means "any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems." Although the regulation does not include a comprehensive
list of all disorders contemplated by the definition, it does list "such diseases and conditions as
orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy,
multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease." Id.
52. Cook, 834 F. Supp. at 62 (D.R.I. 1992). The lower court stated:
to the extent that obesity . . . is caused by systematic or metabolic factors and
constitutes an immutable condition that she is powerless to control, it may be a
physiological disorder qualifying as a handicap. Conversely, to the extent that
obesity is a transitory or self-imposed condition resulting from an individual's
voluntary action or inaction, it would be neither a physiological disorder nor a
handicap.
Id. (citations omitted).
53. Cook v. State of R.I., Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 23-24
(1st Cir. 1993).
54. Id. at 28.
55. 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985).
56. 699 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
57. 480 N.E.2d at 695.
[Vol. 48:649
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Xerox did not hire Catherine McDermott after she failed her preemploy-
ment medical exam because the doctor decided she was obese.58 She
brought suit alleging discriminatory hiring practices.5 9 Although Xerox
argued that they did not hire Catherine McDermott because of the statis-
tical probability of future illness related to her obesity, the court held
that an employer "cannot deny employment simply because the condi-
tion has been detected before it has actually begun to produce deleteri-
ous effects."'  In response to other courts that require the obesity to be
an immutable condition, a New York state court remarked: "We have
found nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicating a legisla-
tive intent to permit employers to refuse to hire persons who are able to
do the job simply because they have a possibly treatable condition of
excessive weight. '61 Therefore, in this instance, the court considered
obesity a handicap.
In contrast, the court in Southwestern Bell62 required the litigant to
show she had attempted to lose weight or seek medical treatment for her
obesity. Southwestern Bell denied the plaintiff, Shirley Hodges,
employment unless she "got her weight under control. '63 The court held
that "by ignoring the situation and taking no steps to treat and control
her impairment [Hodges] cannot get the benefit of the [Missouri] handi-
cap law."'  The court admitted that the ultimate issue, whether "a per-
son with treatable but untreated obesity and moderately high blood
pressure [is] disabled and handicapped within the meaning of the dis-
crimination statute ... "65 could not be addressed due to the insuffi-
58. McDermott stands five feet six inches tall and weighs 249 pounds. Id. at 696.
59. New York Human Rights Law prohibits employment discrimination against the disabled.
It broadly construes "disability" as including "a physical, mental or medical impairment ... ,
[which] is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques."
Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 696 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 698. Cf., C. Wayne Callaway, M.D., Obesity, 102 PuB. HEALTH REP. 26-29 (Supp.
1987) ("[S]ome people come from families in which body size is genetically large. In spite of
exercise and appropriate diet, they may still be well above the appropriate weight ranges in the
tables .... Such people are metabolically normal, even though overweight.").
61. Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 699.
62. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75, 79
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
63. Id. at 76. But see Callaway, supra note 60, at 12 ("If, on the other hand, a person is free
from complications and there is a family history of large stature, then it is inappropriate to try to
get her to meet arbitrary weight tables.").
64. Southwestern Bell, 699 S.W.2d at 79. Contra Oregon State Correctional Inst. v. Bureau
of Labor 780 P.2d 743 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). Relying on an administrative rule, which provides
"[c]onditions which are mutable only upon long-term treatment, and which.., do not impair the
individual's ability to perform the work involved. . . may not form the basis for rejection of the
individual for a position. Examples include . . . obesity .... " the court held that obesity may
describe an impairment where the plaintiff did not receive a position as a correctional officer
because he was fifty pounds overweight. Id. at 747 (emphasis supplied).
65. Southwestern Bell, 699 S.W.2d at 77.
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ciency of the evidence. The court remarked, however, that under the
same definition of disability as provided for by the corresponding fed-
eral law, an obese person, by virtue of their weight alone, is "probably
not" handicapped under the Missouri law.66 Therefore, under this analy-
sis, the litigant must demonstrate an unsuccessful attempt to lose weight
or at least an attempt to receive medical attention to treat the physiologi-
cal disorder. The conflict between the approaches of each court
becomes more evident in the assessment of the difference between
actual and perceived impairments.
The court in Civil Serv. Comm'n of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n 67 examined the distinction. The litigant
needed to demonstrate that he belonged to a protected class, qualified for
a specific position but did not receive it, and that the employer continued
to then look for other applicants.6 s In addition, the complainant had to
establish that he was handicapped within the meaning of the Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act.69 The lower court held that the litigant
established his burden under the third prong of the definition, "regarded
as having an impairment."7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
[b]ecause [the complainant's] obesity was not shown to be a physio-
logical disorder, a cosmetic disfigurement, or an anatomical loss
affecting his body systems, and there is no evidence to indicate that
obesity ever affects body systems, [he] has not shown that obesity is a
handicap within the meaning of the PHRA [Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act].7
Similar to the disposition of Xerox, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
failed to differentiate between "obesity which is self-imposed ... [and]
66. Id.
67. 591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
68. Id. at 282 (citing General Elec. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 365
A.2d 649, 655-56 (Pa. 1976)).
69. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act provides: "It shall be unlawful discriminatory
practice... [flor any employer because of the... non-job related handicap or disability of any
individual to refuse to hire or employ such individual ... if such individual is the best able and
most competent to perform the services required .... Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n,
591 A.2d at 282 (quoting Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, Act of 1974, P.L. 986,
No. 318, 43 P.S. § 955(a)). The Pennsylvania regulations adopted the identical definition
handicap that the ADA does. 16 PA. CODE § 44.4 (1993).
70. "[I]s regarded as having an impairment" means has a physical or mental
impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by
an employer or owner, operator, or provider or a public accommodation as
constituting such a limitation; has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the 'attitudes of others toward such
impairment; or has none of the impairments... but is treated ... as having such an
impairment.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d at 283 (quoting 16 PA. CODE § 44.4 (1991)).
71. Id. at 284.
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that which may be caused by a systemic malfunction."72
The district court in Tudyman v. United Airlines7 3 analyzed another
problem with defining "handicapped" individuals. Under the federal
definition, a "'Catch 22' aspect appears: the plaintiff must first show
that he or she has some impairment which substantially limits a major
life activity, but this same plaintiff must show that he or she is not so
handicapped as to be unable to perform the job. 74 The definition of
"handicapped" utilized by both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
attempts to remedy this situation by their third prong, "regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment." According to the Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee, this definition applies to "a person with some kind
of visible physical impairment which in fact does not substantially limit
that person's functioning. ' 75 This definition should have allowed for the
scenario addressed by the court in Tudyman, where a male body builder
exceeded the weight limit proscribed for a job as a flight attendant. The
court, however, did not believe that the airline perceived the plaintiff as
handicapped solely because he did not qualify for this particular job.76
The court refused to extend the definition to an applicant who failed to
qualify for a particular job because of a single factor. If the court
applied such a standard, any individual who failed to qualify for a spe-
cific job would be considered "handicapped" under the federal defini-
tion.77 "This Court refuses to make the term handicapped a meaningless
phrase."7 " The court also distinguished this case by emphasizing the
issue of the voluntary and self-imposed nature of the plaintiffs "condi-
72. Id. at 284 n.l.
73. 608 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Cal. 1984).
74. Id. at 744.
75. S. REp. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373,
6414. The United States Supreme Court commented on the reasoning behind the third prong of
the definition:
Such an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities,
but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of
the negative reactions of others to the impairment .... [In this component of the
definition,] Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears
about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that
flow from the actual impairment.
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987) (footnote omitted).
76. "There is, however, no authority for the proposition that failure to qualify for a single job
because of some impairment that a plaintiff would otherwise be qualified to perform constitutes
being limited in a major life activity." Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 745.
77. Id. at 746.
78. Id. The court actually seems to be disregarding the third prong of the definition, doing a
disservice as a consequence, as the court appears to condone discrimination in the workplace.
"For good or evil, private employers are generally free to be arbitrary and even capricious in
determining whom to hire, unless the employer somehow discriminates on the basis of ...
handicap status, considerations which Congress has determined to be prohibited." Id. at 746-47.
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tion. ' '79 The court refused to consider his weight a disability because the
litigants did not dispute the cause of the plaintiff's obesity. This
dilemma becomes more apparent in the following cases.
Many courts have considered weight as a handicap under prevailing
state law. The analysis is similar because most state statutes mimic pre-
vailing federal legislation. In Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.,"
a New Jersey appellate court did not differentiate between discrimina-
tion based on an actual or a perceived handicap. Joseph Gimello sued
Agency Rent-A-Car Systems under the New Jersey Law Against Dis-
crimination, which prohibits handicap discrimination in the employment
context." Gimello claimed he lost his job because of his weight. 2
After examining the record, the court adopted a broad definition of
"handicap" that included illnesses with physical and psychological man-
ifestations,83 and concluded that Agency discriminated against Gimello
because of his weight.84  The court failed to distinguish between an
actual and perceived handicap and relied on the findings of the adminis-
trative law judge.85 The administrative law judge perceived Gimello's
obesity as a handicap, and therefore, the court drew a similar
conclusion. 6
The court in Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home,87 in contrast,
stressed the importance of the distinction between an overweight indi-
vidual who is actually handicapped and an individual who is merely
regarded as being handicapped. Mary Krein, a nurse's aid, alleged that
she lost her job due to her weight. Under the North Dakota equivalent to
the ADA, she sued for wrongful termination.8 "However, the mere
assertion that one is overweight or obese is not alone adequate to make a
79. Id. at 746.
80. 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
81. It "prohibit[s] any unlawful discrimination against any person because such person is or
has been at any time handicapped or any unlawful employment practice against such person,
unless the nature and extent of the handicap reasonably precludes the performance of the
particular employment." N.J.S.A. § 10:5-4.1 (Supp. 1993). "Handicapped" is defined as "any
mental, psychological or developmental disability resulting from anatomical, psychological,
physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or
mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. § 10:5-5q.
82. Gimello, 594 A.2d at 265.
83. Id. at 276.
84. Id. at 273.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court did note, however, that medical evidence clearly supported the existence of
Gimello's obese condition. Id. at 278,
87. 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987).
88. In relevant part, North Dakota law provides: "It is a discriminatory practice for an
employer ... to discharge an employee because of physical or mental handicap .... N.D. CNr.
CODE § 14-02.4-03 (Supp. 1993).
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claimant one of the class of persons afforded relief for discrimination
under NDCC Ch. 14-02.4. Something more must be shown."89 Adopt-
ing the common definitions of disability and handicap found in Web-
ster's Dictionary, 90 the court required evidence that the plaintiffs
obesity actually hindered her ability to work. Based on the factual rec-
ord, the court concluded that her weight did not impair her abilities.9'
However, this analysis does not contemplate individuals who are
"regarded as having an impairment." Therefore, under North Dakota
state law, a litigant could not prevail in a suit without proving an actual
impairment. 92
The aforementioned cases illustrate the difficulty in predicting
court decisions regarding obesity in the future. While some courts will
mandate a medical verification of the cause of the condition, others will
require the litigant to establish that she has attempted to seek treatment.
Regardless of the evidence a particular court will require to establish a
prima facie case under the ADA, an overweight individual should be
afforded protection from discrimination if she satisfies the more liberal
standard, "regarded as having an impairment." In instances where she
receives different treatment because of the stereotypes and prejudices
89. Krein, 415 N.W.2d at 796.
90. Webster's Dictionary defines "disability" as "a physical or mental illness, injury or
condition that hinders, impedes or incapacitates" and "handicap" as "a disadvantage that makes
achievement unusually difficult esp. a physical disadvantage that limits the capacity to work." Id.
(quoting WEsBTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971)). The court utilized this
same approach, including the dictionary definition of "handicap," in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 448 A.2d 701 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). After applying
for a position as a customer service representative, the Philadelphia Electric Company "classified
Ms. English as unsuitable for work" because she weighed 340 pounds. Id. at 703. She responded
by filing a complaint under the Pennsylvania anti-discrimination legislation, alleging she was
denied employment "because of her handicap/disability, obesity which does not substantially
interfere with her ability to perform the essential function of the job." Id. The court held that
"morbid obesity may be a handicap or disability within the meaning of the Act, but the condition
of morbid obesity alone, is no such handicap or disability." Id. at 707. After adopting the
aforementioned definitions of "handicap" and "disability," the court established a two-prong test
to be met for Ms. English to prevail on the merits. The test required her to prove that when she
applied for the position she was handicapped under the Act's provision and that Philadelphia
Electric Company did not employ her for that reason. Id. at 705. After evaluating the record, the
court concluded that Ms. English failed to establish her burden of proof, as she did not suffer from
a handicap which hindered her ability to perform the tasks required of a customer service
representative.
91. Krein, 415 N.W.2d at 796.
92. But see Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 591 P.2d 461 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
After Peter Barnes lost his job due to the erroneous belief that he suffered from epilepsy, he
brought an action against his employer under the Washington State Law Against Discrimination.
The court reasoned that although the plaintiff did not actually suffer from epilepsy, "[it would
defeat legislative purpose to limit the handicap provision of the law against discrimination to those
who are actually afflicted with a handicap ... and exclude from its provision those perceived as
having a condition [and are in turn discriminated against]." Id. at 465.
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society "associates" with her obesity, she should be afforded legal
redress for her emotional or financial injury, regardless of whether the
discrimination occurs in the employment or public accommodations
context.
In conjunction with weight and appearance discrimination, an indi-
vidual may be a victim of another form of discrimination, such as sex or
race discrimination. 93 "Obesity can be closely associated with other pro-
tected classes such as race, sex, color, age or religion." 94 In our society,
women and minorities are judged differently in regard to their weight.95
Different standards have been applied to men and women in defining
what is an appropriate appearance. Society allows men to be heavier
than women before they are discriminated against.96  Additionally,
women and minorities have a greater propensity for obesity. Therefore,
as a result, these groups are subject to "double discrimination."97
According to Susie Orbach, a specialist in the treatment of compul-
sive eating, women react to the different expectations in society often by
overeating.9"
Fat is a social disease, and fat is a feminist issue. Fat is not about
lack of self-control or lack of will power. ... It is a response to the
inequality of the sexes. Fat expresses experiences of women today in
93. See Note, supra note 21, at 2042 (footnote omitted) ("Some individual victims of
appearance discrimination who are also members of other, protected groups may find protection
under race, sex, or age discrimination statutes.").
94. Bierman, supra note 13, at 964. "Consequently, obesity should be afforded the same
legislative protections that accompany being a member of a protected class." Id.
95. According to a public health report:
A redefinition of obesity is urgently needed. Our current definitions
discriminate against women more than mean [sic], and then we have this paradox
that the same amount of obesity in a woman is not as hazardous as the same amount
of obesity in men.
Our current definitions discriminate against older people, and they discriminate
against black women, in particular. Even if one uses the most conservative
definition, 60 percent of black women over 45 years of age are considered obese,
and some 35 percent of white women over 45 years of age are considered obese.
Callaway, supra note 60 at 29.
96. Id. at 26-29.
97. Bierman, supra note 13, at 962. The Supreme Court responded and held that "disparate
impact analysis is appropriate whether the employer's discrimination was objective [based on sex
or race] or subjective [based on weight or appearance]. Thus, a plaintiff who can prove that
subjective weight discrimination adversely impacts the race or sex grouping that the person
belongs to will have a plausible cause of action." Id. (footnotes omitted).
98. SusIE ORBACH, FAT IS A FEMINIST ISSUE (1978). Orbach asserts:
For the compulsive eater, fat has much symbolic meaning which makes sense within
a feminist context. Fat is a response to the many oppressive manifestations of a
sexist culture. Fat is a way of saying "no" to powerlessness and self-denial, to a
limiting sexual expression which demands that females look and act a certain way,
and to an image of womanhood that defines a specific social role.
Id. at 20.
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ways that are seldom examined and even more seldom treated. 99
Accordingly, women are more likely to be discriminated against based
on their weight. "Nonetheless, the legal rubric most likely to afford gen-
eral protection for appearance discrimination victims appears to be
handicap discrimination law."''' Therefore in the future, overweight
women will likely have better success fighting weight discrimination
using legislation such as the ADA.
IV. PROTECTION IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
A. A Right to Legal Redress
Prior to the enactment of a public accommodations law establishing
a private cause of action, the court in Marsh v. Edwards Theatres Cir-
cuit, Inc. t01 declined to grant a handicapped plaintiff redress after being
denied access to a public place. 102 Robert Marsh, a quadriplegic, sued
the owner and operator of a movie theater chain for unlawful discrimina-
tion under California law,' 3 after they denied him admission because of
his physical handicap.1°4 The court answered the question of whether
"California law which prohibits discrimination against the physically
handicapped in access to public accommodations require the operator of
such accommodations, absent specific legislation mandating it, to make
structural modifications in order to facilitate access' ' 5 in the negative.
The lack of a legislative mandate requiring them to do so and the need to
meet fire regulations to keep insurance premiums down prompted this
answer. The court reasoned:
The varied and distinctive nature of the numerous handicaps from
which so many people suffer suggests, however, that the problem is
one for which the legislative branch of government is uniquely
equipped to solve. It is in the legislative halls where the numerous
factors involved can be weighed and where the needs can be properly
99. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
100. Note, supra note 21, at 2042 (footnote omitted).
101. 64 Cal. App. 3d 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
102. Contra Bush v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 669 P.2d 324 (Or. 1983). The Bush court
addressed the needs of handicapped individuals to seek legal redress when discriminated against.
Melvin Bush, confined to a wheelchair, sued Greyhound Lines, Inc. after they refused to allow
him to travel on one of their routes. Relying on state law, the court held that the plaintiff had a
private cause of action against the bus company for its discriminatory action. Id.
103. At this time, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the only federal legislation in place, did not
protect an individual from discrimination by a private entity based on a physical handicap. The
relevant California statute provided that "[p]hysically disabled persons shall be entitled to full and
equal access, as other members of the general public, to accommodations." CAL. [CIV.] CODE
§ 54.1 (Supp. 1993).
104. Marsh could have entered the theater, but would have had to sit in a regular seat and did
not want to risk injury being removed from his wheelchair. Marsh, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 886.
105. Id.
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balanced against the economic burdens which of necessity will have
to be borne by the private sector of the economy in providing a
proper and equitable solution to the problem.'
0 6
After a careful analysis, the court concluded that California law simply
requires the private business to "open its doors on an equal basis to all
that can avail themselves of the facilities without violation of other valid
laws and judgments."' °7 The court seemed to be beckoning the legisla-
ture to give public accommodation laws the force and effect it desired.
The ADA accomplished this. Even though overweight individuals
may be considered "handicapped" by some courts, they still must estab-
lish they are entitled to protection in public accommodations and able to
maintain a private cause of action.' 08 While the Rehabilitation Act did
not establish a private cause of action, Congress specifically provided
for one in the ADA. To successfully maintain a discrimination suit, the
obese Iitigant must demonstrate that she has an impairment which either
affects or is regarded as affecting a "major life activity."'" The defini-
tion includes "caring for one's self," which, in view of society's harsh
treatment of the overweight, should be construed broadly to include
access to public places where an individual may purchase food, drinks,
or be entertained. If the court considers each member of society's
"right" to access to public accommodations as fundamental, it must
defend the rights of the obese in public places. Consideration of such a
right as fundamental serves as the only way to break down the stereo-
types and prejudices that the ADA was designed to combat.
Additionally, the litigant must establish that the defendant failed to
comply with the architectural and accessibility requirements of Title
III.'l° The ADA depicts discrimination as a failure to make "reasonable
modifications" or "take such steps as may be necessary" to ensure that
disabled persons have equal access to accommodations, unless it would
result in an "undue burden" or "fundamentally alter" the nature of the
business."' In determining whether a modification would place an
"undue burden" on an entity, the House Education and Labor Committee
instructs courts to make a case-by-case determination, considering the
"overall size of the business, the type of operation, and the nature and
106. Id. at 888.
107. Id. at 892.
108. An insightful court in Eastern Paralyzed Veteran's Ass'n, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 426 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), identified the issue in this type of case more
precisely as whether alleged discrimination exists or whether there was a failure to accommodate
the special needs of the complainant.
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(a) (1992).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1992).
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the cost of the required accommodation."'1 2 To decide if a business will
be "fundamentally altered" by complying with Title III, the court may
consider whether the modifications would "endanger a program's viabil-
ity, [involve] 'massive' financial expenditures, . .. 'jeopardize the effec-
tiveness' of a program or ... involve a 'major restructuring' of an
enterprise."1, 13 These interpretations of "undue burden" and "fundamen-
tal alteration" leave much discretion with the court in making its
determination. 14
Section 12183(a) further mandates that all newly constructed facili-
ties after July 26, 1990 must be accessible to disabled persons unless it is
structurally impracticable.1 15 Therefore, all new facilities must now
comply with these directives. Accordingly, new restaurants and theaters
should be required to install larger seating. Courts should place stricter
standards on these structures since they have been placed on notice that
society will no longer tolerate substandard accommodations for the dis-
abled and the overweight. Since the ADA recently went into effect, it is
only a matter of time before courts will specifically dictate what modifi-
cations they deem reasonable and where prima facie cases of discrimina-
tion exist.
B. Airplanes as Places of Public Accommodation
Although airlines are not considered a "public accommodation"
under the definition supplied by the ADA, overweight individuals do
experience discrimination when travelling on airplanes and often seek
redress.1 16 A 1986 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act provides:
"No air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air
transportation."'1 7  Using this provision and its predecessor, 1 8 many
112. Susser supra note 25, at 171.
113. Burgdorf, supra note 27, at 561 (footnotes omitted).
114. See Bierman, supra note 13, at 962 ("A finding of discrimination based on obesity will
generally be very fact specific and a determination of reasonable accommodation will be required
in each case. This means that although discrimination based on obesity would be prohibited, each
instance of discrimination would necessitate litigation in order to determine if the obesity was the
reason for the employment related decision.").
115. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (1992).
116. Americans Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 762
F. Supp. 320 (D. Utah 1991).
117. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1374(c)(1) (West Supp. 1992). The statute adopts the three prong test for
handicap from the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. "'[H]andicapped individual' means any
individual who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. at § 1374(c)(2).
118. "No air carrier ... shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person . ..or subject any particular person .. . to any unjust
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handicapped individuals have successfully challenged airline discrimina-
tion and maintained private causes of action. 19 However, the question
remains whether airlines will grant overweight individuals "equal
access" to their accommodations without infringing on the rights of their
other customers. Whether overweight people have a right to legal
redress when they are discriminated against still lingers as an
uncertainty.
Canada has proposed one answer to this dilemma. The Canadian
government contemplated adopting a regulation which would require
airlines to provide free extra seats to overweight or disabled individu-
als. 2° This regulation is being
challenged on [Canadian] Constitutional grounds by an association
representing 105 airlines operating here.. .. "What we are contend-
ing is that by giving free seats to the obese or disabled we would be
discriminating against the other passengers. The cost of those extra
seats would have to be borne by the other passengers, adding to the
discrimination."' 121
This argument fails, however, if the seating policy is applied when the
additional seats are available and not occupied by other passengers. It
seems unreasonable for the airline to not try to accommodate their obese
and disabled customers if they would not incur any additional cost. This
policy is exactly what NAAFA urged Southwest Airlines to adopt dur-
ing its recent protest. 122 The group further urges its members to travel
discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatsoever." 49 U.S.C.A § 1374(b) (West Supp. 1992).
119. In Americans Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) v. Skywest Airlines, Inc.,
762 F. Supp. 320 (D. Utah 1991), the court evaluated the availability of redress for handicap
discrimination on an airplane, under the Rehabilitation Act and the Air Carrier Access Act.
Skywest Airlines implemented a policy under which persons confined to wheelchairs could not
travel without a companion. After being refused permission to board a Skywest Airlines flight
because of this policy, Barbara Toomer brought an action under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA). Id. at 322. The court granted summary judgment for the
claim based on the Rehabilitation Act because the airline did not receive adequate federal funds.
(This problem though, would be remedied by the wording of the ADA because it applies to private
entities, if the Legislature intended for it to apply to airplanes.) In response to her other claim,
Skywest responded that Congress enacted the ACAA to make the Rehabilitation Act applicable to
air carriers regardless of whether they received federal funds, and therefore, the same remedies
should be available under both statutes. Id. at 326. After evaluating the legislative history, the
court held that because the ACAA was enacted to supplement the Rehabilitation Act, the same
remedies must be available under both statutes, and that did not include punitive or emotional
distress damages, but did include compensatory damages. Id. at 326-27.
120. Michael T. Kaufman, Airlines Fighting Free-Seat Ruling in Canada, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10,
1982, at A22.
121. Id.
122. In addition, the group requested that Southwest Airlines "[alpologize for harassment of fat
passengers, [slensitize personnel to size-related issues, [and a]ccommodate special needs of fat
passengers." Southwest Protest (NAAFA, Sacramento, Ca.).
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on the least crowded flights so that this may be a viable option. 123
V. CONCLUSION
The rights of the overweight may no longer be ignored. In the
employment context, it seems plausible that overweight individuals
should be afforded legal redress, because employers specifically cite
weight and appearance as the reason for refusing to hire or terminating
employees. In this same regard, weight should constitute a disability in
public accommodations. 2 4 First, the definition of "disabled" applies to
each title of the ADA. The ADA affords individuals the right to "full
and equal enjoyment" of public accommodations and mandates a series
of necessary structural modifications.
[The] access requirements represent a crystallization of societal con-
viction that, at this point in our development, we have enough under-
standing of the significant life limitations imposed by attitudinal,
architectural, and communications barriers on millions of our citizens
to recognize that continued toleration of such barriers is folly. To
continue to erect inaccessible public facilities, for example, when
access can be provided cheaply, is to continue a form of discrimina-
tion that can be characterized as ignorant at best - at worst, as
intentional. 125
Additionally, the ADA established a specific remedy whereby an
aggrieved party could recover damages. While the Rehabilitation Act
did not establish a private cause of action, Congress specifically pro-
vided for one in the ADA. Consistent with the American form of gov-
ernment, the ADA exemplifies Congress protecting the rights of all its
citizens, especially where such prevalent forms of "intentional" discrim-
ination exist, as in newly constructed facilities. Victims of such discrim-
ination must have the opportunity to maintain a cause of action to assert
their rights to equal access and equal enjoyment of public
accommodations.
Therefore, under the ADA, June Allyson Green may be able to
recover special damages based upon the humiliation and indignity she
suffered if she can establish that Greyhound denied her "full and equal
enjoyment" and that reasonable accommodations could have been pro-
123. Airline Travel Tips for the Large-Size Person (NAAFA, Sacramento, Ca.).
124. The court may soon have to address this precise issue in Torcasio v. Murray, 12 F.3d 206
(4th Cir. 1993), where the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to determine whether a prisoner, who
alleged that the prison facility inadequately accommodates his obesity, states a cause of action
under both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA. In a prior decision, LaFaut v. Smith, 834
F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987), the court ruled that a similar issue, involving a paraplegic, was moot
because the prisoner had been transferred to an "adequate" facility prior to the court's adjudication
of the issue.
125. Burgdorf, supra note 27, at 580.
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vided without an undue burden. Lauren R. Januz may be able to force
McDonald's, as well as other restaurants, theaters, and places of public
accommodation, to meet the needs of their overweight customers by
adhering to the accessibility requirements of the ADA and installing
flexible, larger seating, and commercial airlines may attempt to accom-
modate obese passengers by giving them unoccupied seats, so that they
and the other passengers around them may experience "full and equal
enjoyment" of the flight. Although the rights of the overweight should
be accorded certain weight, the rights of the remainder of the population
should not be compromised. If proprietors of public accommodations
understand the special needs of some of their customers and those cus-
tomers understand the added expense of accommodation, the need for
legal redress may one day become unnecessary.
SHARI J. RONKIN
